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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether, after more than year had passed since an adjudication of
parentage had been made in a divorce decree, the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction to set aside a default Decree of Divorce.
Standard of Review: Whether the lower court had subject matter jurisdiction to
set aside its own previous judgment presents a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness. Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 423, f 5, 103 P.3d 171; Lilly v. Lilly, 2011 UT
App 53, 250 P.3d 994.
Issue 2: Whether the Divorce Decree was res judicata on the issue of parentage.
Standard of Review: Whether res judicata bars an action is a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, <P9, 44 P.3d
663 (citing Macris & Assocs.. Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f 17, 16 P.3d 1214).
Issue 3: Whether the parties to an adjudication of parentage that was made in
their decree of divorce are estopped from raising the issue of parentage more than a year
after the decree of divorce was entered.
Standard of Review: Estoppel is generally a mixed question of fact and law
with differing degrees of deference given to the trial court, depending on several
considerations. See Dep't of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarrv, 1997 Utah 84, 945
P.2d 676, 678. However, where the estoppel arises as a matter of statute and the facts are
undisputed, as here, the matter should be treated as one of statutory construction. "The
interpretation of a statute is a question of law," which is reviewed for correctness.
General Constr. & Dev., Inc. v. Peterson Plumbing Supply, 2011 UT 1, ^[5, 248 P.3d 972.
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Issue 4: Whether an Intervenor, who has no legally protectable interest in the
subject matter of the case, and who was not a party to the marriage, has standing to
appeal a final Divorce Decree and Order in which he is not referenced in or bound by.
Standard of Review: Standing is an issue that may be raised for the first time
upon appeal. Blodgett v. Zions First Naf 1 Bank, 1988 Utah App. 61,16, 752 P.2d 901.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Determinative Law:

U.S. CONST, amend. XIV

See, Addendum A
Determinative Law:

UT. CONST, art. VIII, §5

The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited
by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute.
Determinative Law:

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 60 (b)

See, Addendum A
Determinative Law:

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-15-607 (2008).

See, Addendum A
Determinative Law:

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-15-617 (2008).

See, Addendum A
Determinative Law:

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-15-623 (2008).

See, Addendum A
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

The Appellees were divorced by a Decree of Divorce dated September

12, 2006. (R. at 77-91) Said divorce was a default divorce, reached pursuant to an
Agreement of the Appellees.
2.

Appellee Micah filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce seeking

a change in primary physical custody of the child on or about July 16, 2007. (R. at 98)
3.

In her Answer to that Petition to Modify, Appellee Karine filed a Motion

to Dismiss the Petition, which alleged for the first time, that Appellee Micah was not
the biological father of the minor child. (R. at 140)
4.

On or about October 23, 2007, a motion was filed by Appellee Karine to

join Appellant in the action. (R. at 143) The motion was granted, and an order was
signed by the Court, joining Appellant on November 2, 2007. (R. at 145)
5.

On January 3, 2008, Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate the order joining

him as a party to the action. A hearing was held on said motion on March 13, 2008,
and Appellant's motion was granted on May 21, 2008, excusing him from the action.
(R. at 154-155, 245-248)
6.

On July 11, 2008, the Court set aside the Decree of Divorce based upon

a stipulation of the Appellees. (R. at 264)
7.

Appellee Micah then filed a Motion to Admit Genetic Testing, that had

been conducted by the Office of Recovery Services, on or about October 27, 2008. (R.
at 271)
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8.

At a hearing on December 4, 2011, the Court found that the genetic

testing was sufficient to exclude Appellee Micah as the father of said child and
ordered that it be admitted. (R. at 298)
9.

On or about September 3, 2009, the State of Utah commenced a child

support/paternity action against Appellant in civil court no. 094903937.
10.

For the next two years, there was no action in this divorce case, while

Appellant attempted to defend the separate paternity action against him brought by the
State of Utah.
11.

After the Assistant Attorney General filed the paternity case in the

District Court, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that paternity had already
been adjudicated in the present action. That motion was denied by the Commissioner.
Subsequently, Appellant objected and the Commissioner's decision was then
sustained by the Honorable Judge Peuler. (R. at 476) Judge Peuler entered a minute
entry and order which addressed the relevant law and cited this divorce action's
proceedings, finding that paternity in this divorce action had been properly
adjudicated. (R. at 473-476)
12.

In the paternity action, genetic testing was stipulated to by Appellant and

Appellee Reller, and results, identifying Appellant as the biological father were filed
by the State of Utah on July 13, 2010. (R. at 468, 480, 484 - 489)
13.

In the paternity action, temporary orders of custody and support were

entered against Appellant. (R. at 528)
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14.

In the paternity action, September of 2010, Appellant and Appellee

Karine reached a settlement agreement wherein Appellant acknowledged and
stipulated that inter alia, the Court may adjudicate the Appellant as the minor child's
father, and awarded Appellant and Appellee Karine joint legal custody of the parties'
daughter. (R. at 519-525)
15.

A Decree of Paternity was drafted by Appellant attempting to settle the

case. (R. at 508-509) However as parent time was not resolved, the Decree was not
signed by the Court. Id.
16.

Appellant was ordered to pay significant child support and subsequently

has vehemently attempted to obtain relief from paying the ordered child support. (R.
at 527-530)
17.

Approximately two years after the Decree of Bifurcated Divorce was

entered, Appellant filed a motion to intervene in this divorce case. (R. at 313-315)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Appellant lacks standing to bring this case in that there is no stated or argued
legally protectable interest that the Appellant has in the outcome of the Divorce Case.
Additionally, the Appellant is barred from bringing this case under the doctrine of Res
Judicata since the exact same issue and argument were presented, argued and ruled upon
in the paternity case.
The entry of the original Decree on September 12, 2006 was not an adjudication of
paternity based on statute and corresponding case law. The issue of paternity was not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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adjudicated until genetic testing results were admitted into evidence and the court made
an evidence based finding that Appellee Micah was excluded as the father of the child.
The original Decree was properly set aside and subsequently, the paternity of the child
was then properly adjudicated.
If a true adjudication had occurred prior to, or with, the original decree being
entered, the Appellant would be correct, however it did not. A clear reading of the entire
statute upon which the Appellant relies in his adjudication argument shows that an
adjudication of paternity does not occur when a default judgment in a divorce is entered
by the Court.
Subject matter for the District Court to hear this matter exists and is incorrectly
argued and applied by the Appellant.
The Appellant's attempt to unscrupulously run around the State of Utah's efforts
to establish him as the legal father of a child to which he is unquestionably the biological
father should not be allowed. Appellant is simply attempting to attack the correct
adjudication of paternity in this divorce case to dispute his own paternity. The proper
avenue for disputing his paternity is in the paternity case to which he is a party.

ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
L

APPELLANT LACKS STANDING TO BRING THIS APPEAL,
The appellant lacks standing in the present case; accordingly, the appeal should be

dismissed. Standing is a threshold issue the Court must address prior to looking at any of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the substantive issues on appeal. "Utah law required that the parties to a lawsuit have a
sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute in order to confer standing upon
them" Terracor v. Utah Bd. Of State Lands & Forestry, 1986 Utah 761, f9, 716 P.2d 796.
This issue may be raised for the first time upon appeal. Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 1988 Utah App. 61, <J[6, 752 P.2d 901. In the present case the Appellant does not
have standing because his own actions preclude him having an interest in this case, and
there is no statutory or common law legally protectable interest that Appellant has in
Appellees' divorce.
Wade v. Burke sets forth the three general standards under which standing can be
awarded. " [l]The party must be able to show that he or she has suffered some distinct
and palpable injury that gives him or her a personal stake in the outcome of the legal
dispute. [2] If the party does not have standing under the first criterion, he or she may
have standing if no one else has a has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and the
issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular party has standing to raise the
issue. [3] Even though the party may not have standing under the first two criteria, he or
she may, nevertheless, have standing if the issues are unique and of such great public
importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public interest... If the
party does not qualify under any of these there tests, we will not render an advisory
opinion but will dismiss the action." Wade v. Burke, 1991 Utah App. 60, <|[9, 800 P.2d
1106.
The Supreme Court has given additional clarification on the issue of standing. In
Jones v. Barlow, the Court held that "[under] the traditional test for standing, 'the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

interests of the parties must be adverse' and 'the parties must have a legally protectable
interest in the controversy'." And that the interest must be "legally protectable under
either a statute or the common law." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 Utah 26, 154 P. 3d 808.
The parties attempted to join Appellant in this divorce case, and he objected and
asserted that he did not have an interest in the present matter and subsequently as a result
of his objection; the order joining him was vacated. (R. at 154-237, 266-270)
Commissioner Tack entered a minute entry order vacating his joinder on May 21, 2008.
(R. at 268) From that point on, he was not a party and did not seek an interest in this case
until nearly two years later when he filed a Motion to Intervene. (R. at 313-315) In fact,
a timely objection to the Commissioner's recommendation allowing his recent
intervention has been filed, but as a result of this appeal the District Court has declined to
hear said objection. (R. at 432)
In the present case, the appellant does not claim a statutory or common law
protectable interest. Even if he did state an interest, it is not a protectable one. No statute
confers a right to a third party to seek a re-adjudication of paternity to an outsider or that
an outsider may set aside a Decree of Divorce. Additionally, Appellant does not claim,
nor is there, a legally protectable interest under common law. While Appellant
Argenziano does not have standing here, he does have clear standing in the ongoing
paternity action, and that is the case in which his rights and responsibilities regarding the
minor child should be decided.
In this case the appellant claims no interest in the marital assets, or obligations or
custody or visitation of the child, which are the interests addressed by the divorce. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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child is not a subject of the divorce orders and the Appellant did not, and will not, lose
any legally protectable interest as a result of the divorce action being finalized. Thus, he
does not have a personal stake in the outcome of the divorce under the first prong.
Second, he does not have a greater interest in the outcome of the divorce proceeding than
the parties. He has no interest in whether or not the parties are divorced or what the
terms of the divorce are. Third, similar to the Wade v. Burke case where the Court held
that "this case is a private dispute without sufficient public importance to confer
standing" and without uniqueness or public importance enough that standing ought to be
conferred, this case also does not have uniqueness or importance enough to confer
standing on the Appellant. Wade at \\2.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he purpose of divorce is to end
marriage and allow the parties to make as much of a clean break from each other as is
reasonably possible." Gardner v. Gardner, 1988 Utah 15, 748 P.2d 1076. The divorce
action is to establish the rights and responsibilities of the Appellees in respect to the
dissolution of their marriage. No rights or responsibilities of the Appellant are addressed
or established. He is not even referred to in any of the orders that are the subject of the
appeal. In fact, in the paternity case, Appellant has been awarded not only visitation
rights to the minor child but also joint legal custody of the minor child and is allowed to
be actively involved in his 6 year old daughter's life. His failures to assert or exercise his
rights are of his own accord and his rights have not been negatively impacted by the
paternity adjudication that occurred in this Divorce. The Court in the present case did not
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order or address the issue of support of the child or any other issue regarding the
Appellant and thus, Appellant's standing should be denied.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO SET ASIDE THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND TO SUBSEQUENTLY ADJUDICATE
APPELLEE MICAH RELLER TO NOT BE THE FATHER OF THE
MINOR CHILD,
A. A Stipulated Default Decree of Divorce Does Not Constitute an
Adjudication.
An adjudication by a Court requires more than a mere adoption of a stipulation, it

requires the receipt of evidence and fact finding by the Court. Phillips ex rel. Utah State
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Jackson, 1980 Utah 1001, <j[18, 615 P.2d 1228. The parties in this
matter stipulated to an entry of a Decree of Divorce, by Respondent's signing of an
acceptance of service, appearance, consent and waiver. (R. at 35-37) By consenting to
entry of her default, the tribunal or Court, never addressed the issue of paternity of the
minor child.
Our Supreme Court has ruled on the issue, and found that stipulated Decrees of
Divorce and Decrees of Divorce entered pursuant to a default judgment of one of the
parties pursuant to Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are not to be considered
adjudicated for a myriad of reasons. See, Elmer v. Elmer, 1989 Utah 33, \\2, 776 P.2d
599.
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In Elmer, the Court addressed the issue of child custody, and indicated that the
best interests of the minor child were never visited by the Court as it took no evidence,
but merely adopted the agreement reached by the parties. Id In the present case, the same
principal holds true, as the Court never addressed or took evidence as pertaining to the
issue of a determination of paternity. The Court merely applied the marital presumption
of paternity set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-201, adopted the agreement of the
parties and signed the Decree of Divorce without the Court adjudicating said issue.
B. The Appellees Were Not Estopped From Raising the Issue of Parentage
under the Utah Parentage Act.
The parties were not estopped from raising the issue of parentage. If the issue of
parentage has been raised in divorce pleadings and the tribunal has addressed the issue
and entered an order, the parties are estopped from raising the issue again and the order
of the tribunal may not be challenged on the basis of material mistake of fact. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607(l)(a). However, in this case the matter had not been
adjudicated by the tribunal and the issue was not challenged on the basis of material
mistake of fact.
In a proceeding to dissolve marriage, the tribunal is considered to have made an
adjudication of parentage if the question of parentage is raised and the tribunal
adjudicates according to Part 6, "Adjudication of Parentage", of the Utah Parentage Act
and the final order either expressly identifies a child as a child of the marriage or provides
support. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-623(3). Part 6 of the Utah Parentage Act consists of
Utah Code sections 78B-15-601 through 78B-15-623, and more specifically Utah Code
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sections 78B-15-617 through 78B-15-621, which are titled "Adjudication of Parentage."
To adjudicate the paternity of a child, a presumed or declared father may be disproved
only by admissible results of genetic testing excluding that man as the father or
identifying another man as the father. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-617(1). Additionally,
the Utah Uniform Parentage Act sets the standard of proof to establish paternity as by
"clear and convincing evidence," inferring that fact finding is necessary to constitute an
adjudication. See, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-112.
At the time the original Decree was set aside, there had been no evidence of
genetic testing presented to the court proving or disproving Appellee Micah Reller as
father. Appellant argues that the original stipulated Decree was adjudicated, and in setting
out the applicable law, truncates the statute, leaving out crucial language thereby,
misstating the law: "The divorce court is deemed to have adjudicated paternity if "the
final order: (a) expressly identifies a child as a 'child of the marriage...; or (b) provides
for support by the husband." (Br. for Appellant at 15) Appellant inadvertently or
intentionally leaves out the statutory language that also requires the tribunal adjudicate
according to Part 6 of the Act. A complete reading of the statute, as set out above, reveals
that the issue of parentage had not, in fact, been adjudicated in the original Decree as
Appellant argues. In fact, after the original Decree was set aside, the Court then received
evidence in the form of genetic testing results excluding Appellee Micah Reller as father.
(R. at 298) Only then was the issue of parentage adjudicated according to the statute.
Furthermore, Appellant's argument is misguided in that Appellees did not have to
challenge paternity based on mistake of fact. Instead, the original stipulated Decree was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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properly set aside, and the issue of paternity was raised by the parties' for the first time in
accordance with the Utah Parentage Act.
C. The Trial Court Properly Set Aside the Original Decree of Divorce According
to Relevant Case Law and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court had jurisdiction to order the relief requested in Appellees' Stipulation to
Set Aside Decree of Divorce. Stipulation agreements pertaining to matters of divorce,
custody, and property rights will usually be adopted unless the court determines that the
agreement is unfair or unreasonable. Bryner v. Bryner, 2009 Utah App. 217, fl. Courts
may, in the furtherance of justice, and by motion or on its own accord, relieve a party
from a final judgment and order for a variety of reasons, including any reason justifying
relief from the judgment or order and or fraud. See, UTAH R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
Furthermore, there is no time limit on the court's ability to set aside a judgment under
UTAH

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). See Id.
In this case, the trial court, being fully advised and for good cause, entered the

Order Setting Aside the Decree of Divorce on July 11, 2008. (R. at 264) In fact, in an
earlier minute entry and order, the Commissioner indicated that the issue of paternity
would be properly before the court in accordance with 78B-15-623(6), if the original
Decree was set aside. (See R. 268 at <][10) Based on that order of the Court, and
considering a range of intimate facts surrounding Appellee's divorce, Appellees agreed it
was in their interest, and the interest of the child, to set aside the default Decree. Some of
those facts may have included that Appellee Karine was aware prior to her divorce from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellee Micah that he was not the father of the minor child and did not disclose that to
the Court or to Appellee Micah. (R. at 139-142) In as much, Appellee Micah believed
Appellee Karine's conduct to constitute a fraud upon him and the Court. Accordingly,
Appellees realized there was a basis in law and fact, and entered into settlement
negotiations, which resulted in the stipulation setting aside the original decree. Appellee
Micah, wishing to properly adjudicate his paternity, he motioned the Court to admit
genetic testing excluding him as the father of the minor child. (R. at 301-303)
Requests to set aside a judgment or decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) must be made
within a reasonable time. See, Richens v. Delbert Chipman, & Sons, 1991 Utah App.
124, 817 P. 2d 382. Appellee Micah first received the news that he may not be the father
of the minor child in early November of 2007. (R. at 139-142) Appellee Karine attempted
to join Appellant in this matter in late October 2007. (R. at 143-144) Appellant sought to
vacate the order joining him as a party to this matter. (R. at 154-156, 157-237) Appellant
prevailed on his motion to vacate the order joining him as a party at a hearing held on
March 13, 2008. (R. at 245-248) Appellant was, on his own motion, excused from this
case on May 21, 2008. (R. at 245-247) Subsequently, upon receipt of genetic testing
result which by clear and convincing evidence excluded Appellee Micah as the biological
father of the minor child, the parties sought entry of the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce as
Appellees had remaining personal property and financial issues which were not yet
resolved between them. The Bifurcated Decree of Divorce inter alia, disposed of the
issue of paternity of the minor child and divorced the parties upon appropriate grounds
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and within a reasonable time after Appellee Micah learned of the paternity issue. (R. at
308-310)
The fact that the original Decree was set aside, invalidates Appellant's argument
that Appellees were estopped from raising the issue of paternity. Appellant provides a
lengthy argument that the parties were estopped from "modifying" "challenging" or
"collaterally attacking" paternity. (See Br. for Appellant at Sections I-III) None of these
arguments are relevant if the court properly set aside the original Decree. Once the
Decree was set aside, whether under the Utah Parentage Act, Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), or relevant case law, the issue of paternity was properly before the
court.
D. The Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Set Aside, and Then Properly
Adjudicate Paternity.
Appellant bases his subject matter argument on the underlying argument that the
trial court's order setting aside the original decree was in error. However, in Johnson v.
Johnson, the Supreme Court rejected such a broad view of subject matter jurisdiction
challenge and held that "[t]he concept of subject matter jurisdiction does not embrace all
cases where the court's competence is at issue." Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, \9,
234 P.3d 1100.
In Baby E.Z. v. T.I.Z., the Court held that "[a] court has subject matter jurisdiction
when it has "the authority . . . to decide the case." Baby E.Z. v. T.I.Z.. 2011 UT 38, <P0.
And that "[t]he Utah Constitution vests the judicial power of the state in the....district
court" and "[t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
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limited by this constitution or by the statute." Id. at 131. No statute, including the Utah
Parentage Act, limits the authority the district court has to decide paternity matters. The
Court has "limited the concept of subject matter jurisdiction to those cases in which the
court lacks authority to hear a class of cases, rather than when it simply lacks authority to
grant relief in an individual case." Id.
Appellant argues that because the case had been previously adjudicated, this
divested the District Court from the authority to set aside the Decree or enter into a new
Decree that disestablished appellee Micah as the presumed legal father. This does not
hold. Even if the Court had misinterpreted the statute or not followed the law, the Court
would still have subject matter jurisdiction to make decisions and orders in the divorce
case. Appellant's argument that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction is
actually an attack on the trial court's competence. Since the District Court clearly has the
authority to decide matters of parentage and paternity, subject matter jurisdiction over the
present matter exists in this case.
Furthermore, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was previously addressed and
ruled on by the Honorable Judge Sandra Peuler in the paternity case. (R. at 473-476)
Appellant is seeking a second bite at the apple by intervening in this action for the
purpose of filing this appeal.
E. The Appellees Were Not Estopped From Raising the Issue of Paternity under
the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata is not applicable because the issue of paternity was
not adjudicated. When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to those
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issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues which the party had a
fair opportunity to present an issue and have it determined. Jacobsen v Jacobsen, 1985
Utah 860,14, 703 P.2d 303 (citing Mendenhall v Kingston, 1980 Utah 919, 610 P.2d
1090). In a proceeding to dissolve marriage, the tribunal is considered to have made an
adjudication of parentage if the question of parentage is raised and the tribunal
adjudicates according to Part 6, "Adjudication of Parentage", of the Utah Parentage Act
and the final order either expressly identifies a child as a child of the marriage or provides
support. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-623(3).
As demonstrated above, the original default Decree of Divorce was not
adjudicated. Both case law and the Utah Parentage Act support the conclusion that a
stipulated default divorce decree does not constitute an adjudication of paternity.
Therefore, the issue was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
III.

IF THE COURT WERE TO RULE IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT, IT
WOULD SET A DANGEROUS PUBLIC POLICY THAT WOULD BE
INEQUITABLE AND WOULD NOT CONFORM TO THE MORALS AND
STANDARDS OF THIS STATE/COMMUNITY.
The most poignant statement made by Appellant in his entire brief is "Micah

Reller may not be the child's father." (Br. of Appellant at 26) Appellee Micah Reller is
not the minor child's father. As stated here and above, Appellee Micah was twice
excluded as the father of the minor child by genetic testing.
Appellant is the father of the minor child. This was established by genetic testing
which the Appellant stipulated to and was provided to the court. (R. at 378 - 478) The
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results of the genetic testing established him as the father by 99.99% probability. (R. at
378)
Appellant correctly cites in his brief the argument that the presumption of
legitimacy is so strong that to rebut it requires proof to the contrary beyond a reasonable
doubt. Lopes v. Lopes, 1974 Utah 676, fl9 518 P. 2d 687. Such a presumption has been
rebutted in the instant case pursuant to genetic testing of the minor child, Appellee Micah
and the Appellant. (R. at 304-307)
The only party who is attempting to illegitimatize the minor child is the child's
biological father, the Appellant. Appellant has even signed a stipulation and been
awarded parent time rights with the minor child in the paternity action. (R. at 496-506,
512) Appellee Micah Reller has no relationship with the minor child, and has not had a
relationship with the minor child for almost the entirety of her life; nor will he ever have
one. The child is not his, regardless of how the Court rules. This Court has held that:
.. .where one party to the controversy is a nonparent, there is a presumption in
favor of the natural parent. The presumption recognizes the natural right and
authority of the parent to the child's custody. It is rooted in the common
experience of mankind, which teaches that parent and child normally share a
strong attachment or bond for each other, that a natural parent will normally
sacrifice personal interest and welfare for the child's benefit, and that a natural
parent is normally more sympathetic and understanding and better able to win
the confidence and love of the child than anyone else. Marchand v. Marchand,
2006 Utah App. 429.
The net effect of the Court's ruling will impact this child. Appellee Micah Reller
will not form a bond with a child that is not his, and with whom he has never had a
significant relationship. Appellant, being the child's biological father will be more likely
to share a strong attachment with the minor child. Appellee Micah Reller has not
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established a parent-child relationship with the minor child, because the child was an
infant when the parties' separated, and he has not seen her since. Accordingly, for the
Court to continue to enforce the current and final order of the Court would not be
disruptive or unnecessary as the Court sets forth in Pearson as cited by Appellant. See,
Pearson v.Pearson, 2008 Utah 53, 182 P. 3d 353.
Probably the most prejudicial argument and inequitable policy that would be
adopted if the Court were to rule in favor of Appellant, would be that the Court would
create a precedent that would permit an individual to in bad faith, invade a marriage,
engage in extramarital sexual relations with a party to the marriage which results in
pregnancy, and then require the innocent spouse to provide financial support to a child
not his own for the remainder of that child's minority, while permitting the party who
engaged in the bad faith conduct to escape any responsibility for his child. The same just
cannot stand, and smacks against the very policy of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act.
Appellees argue that it was never the intent of the legislature to create such a precedent.
Appellee Karine did not pursue child support from Appellant due to him being "a more
wealthy man," as argued by Appellant. (Br. for Appellant at 19) She pursued child
support from the biological father of the child. Appellant's argument is in bad faith, and
should permit the Appellees of limited resources and means to recover attorney's fees
and costs of Court against Appellant, especially in light of the repeated attempts to
litigate and re-litigate the same issues in two (2) different civil court cases.
Appellees believe that it was not the intent of the Legislature to make it less
difficult for parties who are not married, and conceive or father children, to determine
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appropriate parentage than for married couples. See, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-306
through § 307; and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607. The same would have the effect of
discriminating against married versus unmarried potential parents by placing additional
restrictions and making it more difficult for parties who have been married to challenge
paternity of a child who may not be their biological child. The same may be construed as
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See also, U.S. CONST, amend. XIV.
CONCLUSION
A stipulated default entry of a Decree of Divorce does not constitute an
adjudicated, finding of paternity. The Court appropriately set aside the Decree of
Divorce in the matter pursuant to either Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
or pursuant to the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, or both. The Court also appropriately
ordered genetic testing and entered findings after evidence was presented as to whether or
not Appellee Micah Reller was the father of the minor child. Additionally, Appellant
lacks standing to bring this appeal and should be barred by the doctrines of collateral
estoppel and res judicata as he has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate all
issues within this appeal in another matter, has done so, and is attempting to re-litigate
the issues here and now. Accordingly, as Appellant has presented these arguments in bad
faith, Appellees should be awarded their costs and attorney's fees for having to defend
against this appeal.
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U.S. CONST, amend. XIV
Fourteenth Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of
Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives
in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twentyone years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United
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States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or
as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.

UTAH CODE ANN,

§786-15-112 (2008)

Standard of proof.
The standard of proof in a trial to determine paternity is "by clear and convincing
evidence."
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-201 (2008)

Establishment of parent-child relationship.
(1) The mother-child relationship is established between a woman and a child by:
(a) the woman's having given birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in
Part 8, Gestational Agreement;
(b) an adjudication of the woman's maternity;
(c) adoption of the child by the woman; or
(d) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a
gestational mother if the agreement was validated under Part 8, Gestational Agreement,
or is enforceable under other law.
(2) The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child by:
(a) an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity of the child under
Section 78B-15-204;
(b) an effective declaration of paternity by the man under Part 3, Voluntary
Declaration of Paternity, unless the declaration has been rescinded or successfully
challenged;
(c) an adjudication of the man's paternity;
(d) adoption of the child by the man;
(e) the man having consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under Part 7,
Assisted Reproduction, which resulted in the birth of the child; or
(f) an adjudication confirming the man as a parent of a child bom to a gestational
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mother if the agreement was validated under Part 8, Gestational Agreement, or is
enforceable under other law.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-306 (2008)

Proceeding for rescission.
(1) A signatory may rescind a declaration of paternity or denial of paternity by
filing a voluntary rescission document with the Office of Vital Records in a form
prescribed by the office before the earlier of:
(a) 60 days after the effective date of the declaration or denial, as provided in
Sections 78B-15-303 and 78B-15-304; or
(b) the date of notice of the first adjudicative proceeding to which the signatory is
a party, before a tribunal to adjudicate an issue relating to the child, including a
proceeding that establishes support.
(2) Upon receiving a voluntary rescission document from a signatory under
Subsection (1), the Office of Vital Records shall provide notice of the rescission, by mail,
to the other signatory at the last-known address of that signatory.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-307 (2008)

Challenge after expiration of period for rescission.
(1) After the period for rescission under Section 78B-15-306 has expired, a
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signatory of a declaration of paternity or denial of paternity, or a support-enforcement
agency, may commence a proceeding to challenge the declaration or denial only on the
basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.
(2) A party challenging a declaration of paternity or denial of paternity has the
burden of proof.
(3) A challenge brought on the basis of fraud or duress may be commenced at
anytime.
(4) A challenge brought on the basis of a material mistake of fact may be
commenced within four years after the declaration is filed with the Office of Vital
Records. For the purposes of this Subsection (4), if the declaration of paternity was filed
with the Office of Vital Records prior to May 1, 2005, a challenge may be brought within
four years after May 1, 2005.
(5) For purposes of Subsection (4), genetic test results that exclude a declarant
father or that rebuttably identify another man as the father in accordance with
Section 78B-15-505 constitute a material mistake of fact.

UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-15-601 (2008)
Proceeding authorized - Definition
(1) An adjudicative proceeding may be maintained to determine the parentage of a
child. A judicial proceeding is governed by the rules of civil procedure. An
administrative proceeding is governed by Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
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Procedures Act.
(2) For the purposes of this part, "divorce" also includes an annulment.

UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-15-602 (2008)
Standing to maintain proceeding.
Subject to Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity, and Sections 78B-15607 and 78B-15-609, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by:
(1) the child;
(2) the mother of the child;
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated;
(4) the support-enforcement agency or other governmental agency authorized by
other law;
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency;
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would
otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated, or a
minor; or
(7) an intended parent under Part 8, Gestational Agreement.
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-603 (2008)

Parties to proceeding.
The following individuals shall be joined as parties in a proceeding to adjudicate
parentage:
(1) the mother of the child;
(2) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated; and
(3) the state pursuant to Section 78B-12-113.

UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-15-604 (2008)
Personal jurisdiction.
(1) An individual may not be adjudicated to be a parent unless the tribunal has
personal jurisdiction over the individual.
(2) A tribunal of this state having jurisdiction to adjudicate parentage may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, or the guardian or
conservator of the individual, if the conditions prescribed in Section 78B-14-201 are
fulfilled, or the individual has signed a declaration of paternity.
(3) Lack of jurisdiction over one individual does not preclude the tribunal from
making an adjudication of parentage binding on another individual over whom the
tribunal has personal jurisdiction.
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-605 (2008)

Venue.
Venue for a judicial proceeding to adjudicate parentage is in the county of this
state in which:
(1) the child resides or is found;
(2) the respondent resides or is found if the child does not reside in this state; or
(3) a proceeding for probate or administration of the presumed or alleged father's
estate has been commenced.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-606 (2008)

No limitation - Child having no declarant or adjudicated father.
A proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having no declarant or
adjudicated father may be commenced at any time. If initiated after the child becomes an
adult, only the child may initiate the proceeding.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-607 (2008)

Limitation -- Child having presumed father.
(1) Paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage with a presumed
father as described in Subsection 78B-15-204(l)(a),(b), or (c), may be raised by the
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presumed father or the mother at any time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the
pleadings at the time of the divorce of the parents.
(a) If the issue is raised prior to the adjudication, genetic testing may be ordered
by the tribunal in accordance with Section 78B-15-608. Failure of the mother of the child
to appear for testing may result in an order allowing a motherless calculation of paternity.
Failure of the mother to make the child available may not result in a determination that
the presumed father is not the father, but shall allow for appropriate proceedings to
compel the cooperation of the mother. If the question of paternity has been raised in the
pleadings in a divorce and the tribunal addresses the issue and enters an order, the parties
are estopped from raising the issue again, and the order of the tribunal may not be
challenged on the basis of material mistake of fact.
(b) If the presumed father seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, then denial
of a motion seeking an order for genetic testing or a decision to disregard genetic test
results shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) If the mother seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, the mother has the
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be in the best interests
of the child to disestablish the parent-child relationship.
(2) For the presumption outside of marriage described in Subsection 78B-15204(1 )(d), the presumption may be rebutted at any time if the tribunal determines that the
presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged in sexual
intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception.
(3) The presumption may be rebutted by:
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(a) genetic test results that exclude the presumed father;
(b) genetic test results that rebuttably identify another man as the father in
accordance with Section 78B-15-505;
(c) evidence that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither
cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of
conception; or
(d) an adjudication under this part.
(4) There is no presumption to rebut if the presumed father was properly served
and there has been a final adjudication of the issue.

UTAH CODE ANN. §786-15-608 (2008)
Authority to deny motion for genetic testing or disregard test results.
(1) In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed
father or to challenge the paternity of a child having a declarant father, the tribunal may
deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing of the mother, the child, and the
presumed or declarant father, or if testing has been completed, the tribunal may disregard
genetic test results that exclude the presumed or declarant father if the tribunal
determines that:
(a) the conduct of the mother or the presumed or declarant father estops that
party from denying parentage; and
(b) it would be inequitable to disrupt the father-child relationship between the
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child and the presumed or declarant father.
(2) In determining whether to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing
or to disregard genetic test results under this section, the tribunal shall consider the best
interest of the child, including the following factors:
(a) the length of time between the proceeding to adjudicate parentage and the
time that the presumed or declarant father was placed on notice that he might not be the
genetic father;
(b) the length of time during which the presumed or declarant father has assumed
the role of father of the child;
(c) the facts surrounding the presumed or declarant father's discovery of his
possible nonpaternity;
(d) the nature of the relationship between the child and the presumed or declarant
father;
(e) the age of the child;
(f) the harm that may result to the child if presumed or declared paternity is
successfully disestablished;
(g) the nature of the relationship between the child and any alleged father;
(h) the extent to which the passage of time reduces the chances of establishing
the paternity of another man and a child-support obligation in favor of the child; and
(i) other factors that may affect the equities arising from the disruption of the
father-child relationship between the child and the presumed or declarant father or the
chance of other harm to the child.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

(3) If the tribunal denies a motion seeking an order for genetic testing or
disregards genetic test results that exclude the presumed or declarant father, it shall issue
an order adjudicating the presumed or declarant father to be the father of the child.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-609 (2008)

Limitation -- Child having declarant father.
(1) If a child has a declarant father, a signatory to the declaration of paternity or
denial of paternity or a support-enforcement agency may commence a proceeding
seeking to rescind the declaration or denial or challenge the paternity of the child only
within the time allowed under Section 78B-15-306 or 78B-15-307.
(2) A proceeding under this section is subject to the application of the principles
of estoppel established in Section 78B-15-608.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-610 (2008)

Joinder of judicial proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2), a judicial proceeding to
adjudicate parentage may be joined with a proceeding for adoption, termination of
parental rights, child custody or visitation, child support, divorce, annulment, legal
separation or separate maintenance, probate or administration of an estate, or other
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appropriate proceeding.
(2) A respondent may not join a proceeding described in Subsection (1) with a
proceeding to adjudicate parentage brought under Title 78B, Chapter 14, Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act.

UTAH

CODE ANN. §78B-15-611 (2008)
Proceeding before birth.
A proceeding to determine parentage may be commenced before the birth of the

child, but may not be concluded until after the birth of the child. The following actions
may be taken before the birth of the child:
(1) service of process;
(2) discovery; and

*

(3) except as prohibited by Section 78B-15-502, collection of specimens for
genetic testing.

UTAH CODE ANN. §788-15-612 (2008)
Child as party — Representation.
(1) A minor child is a permissible party, but is not a necessary party to a
proceeding under this part.
(2) The tribunal may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent a minor or
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incapacitated child if the child is a party or the tribunal finds that the interests of the child
are not adequately represented.

UTAH CODE ANN. §786-15-613 (2008)
Admissibility of results of genetic testing -- Expenses.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), a record of a genetic-testing
expert is admissible as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted in the report unless a
party objects to its admission within 14 days after its receipt by the objecting party and
cites specific grounds for exclusion. Unless a party files a timely objection, testimony
shall be in affidavit form. The admissibility of the report is not affected by whether the
testing was performed:
(a) voluntarily or pursuant to an order of the tribunal; or
(b) before or after the commencement of the proceeding.
(2) A party objecting to the results of genetic testing may call one or more
genetic-testing experts to testify in person or by telephone, video conference, deposition,
or another method approved by the tribunal. Unless otherwise ordered by the tribunal, the
party offering the testimony bears the expense for the expert testifying.
(3) If a child has a presumed or declarant father, the results of genetic testing are
inadmissible to adjudicate parentage unless performed:
(a) pursuant to Section 78B-15-503;
(b) within the time periods set forth in this chapter; and
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(c) pursuant to a tribunal order or administrative process; or
(d) with the consent of both the mother and the presumed or declarant father.
(4) If a child has an adjudicated father, the results of genetic testing are
inadmissible to challenge paternity except as set forth in Sections 78B-15-607 and 78B15-608.
(5) Copies of bills for genetic testing and for prenatal and postnatal health care
for the mother and child which are furnished to the adverse party not less than 10 days
before the date of a hearing are admissible to establish:
(a) the amount of the charges billed; and
(b) that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary.

UTAH CODE ANN. §788-15-614 (2008)
Consequences of failing to submit to genetic testing.
(1) An order for genetic testing is enforceable by contempt.
(2) If an individual whose paternity is being determined fails to submit to genetic
testing ordered by the tribunal, the tribunal for that reason may adjudicate parentage
contrary to the position of that individual.
(3) Genetic testing of the mother of a child is not a condition precedent to testing
the child and a man whose paternity is being determined. If the mother is unavailable or
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fails to submit to genetic testing, the tribunal may order the testing of the child and every
man who is potentially the father of the child.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-615 (2008)

Admission of paternity authorized.
(1) A respondent in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may admit to the
paternity of a child by filing a pleading to that effect or by admitting paternity under
penalty of perjury when making an appearance or during a hearing.
(2) If the tribunal finds that the admission of paternity satisfies the requirements
of this section and finds that there is no reason to question the admission, the tribunal
shall issue an order adjudicating the child to be the child of the man admitting paternity.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-616 (2008)

Temporary order.
(1) In a proceeding under this part, the tribunal shall issue a temporary order for
support of a child if the order is appropriate and the individual ordered to pay support is:
(a) a presumed father of the child;
(b) petitioning to have his paternity adjudicated;
(c) identified as the father through genetic testing under Section 78B-15-505;
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(d) an alleged father who has failed to submit to genetic testing;
(e) shown by clear and convincing evidence to be the father of the child; or
(f) the mother of the child.
(2) A temporary tribunal order may include provisions for custody and visitation
as provided by other laws of this state.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-617 (2008)

Rules for adjudication of paternity
The tribunal shall apply the following rules to adjudicate the paternity of a child:
(1) The paternity of a child having a presumed, declarant, or adjudicated father
may be disproved only by admissible results of genetic testing excluding that man as the
father of the child or identifying another man as the father of the child.
(2) Unless the results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of
genetic testing, a man identified as the father of a child under Section 78B-15-505 must
be adjudicated the father of the child, unless an exception is granted under Section 78B15-608.
(3) If the tribunal finds that genetic testing under Section 78B-15-505 neither
identifies nor excludes a man as the father of a child, the tribunal may not dismiss the
proceeding. In that event, the tribunal shall order further testing.
(4) Unless the results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of
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genetic testing, a man properly excluded as the father of a child by genetic testing must
be adjudicated not to be the father of the child.

UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-15-618 (2008)
Adjudication of parentage -- Jury trial prohibited.
A jury trial is prohibited to adjudicate paternity of a child.

UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-15-619 (2008)
Adjudication of parentage -- Hearings ~ Inspection of records.
(1) On request of a party and for good cause shown, the tribunal may close a
proceeding under this part.
(2) A final order in a proceeding under this part is available for public inspection.
Other papers and records are available only with the consent of the parties or on order of
the tribunal for good cause.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78B-15-620 (2008)

Adjudication of parentage -- Order on default.
The tribunal shall issue an order adjudicating the paternity of a man who:
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(1) after service of process, is in default; and
(2) is found by the tribunal to be the father of a child.

UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-15-621 (2008)
Adjudication of parentage — Dismissal for want of prosecution.
The tribunal may issue an order dismissing a proceeding commenced under this
chapter for want of prosecution only without prejudice. An order of dismissal for want of
prosecution purportedly with prejudice is void and has only the effect of a dismissal
without prejudice.

UTAH CODE ANN. §788-15-622 (2008)
Order adjudicating parentage.
(1) The tribunal shall issue an order adjudicating whether a man alleged or
claiming to be the father is the parent of the child.
(2) An order adjudicating parentage must identify the child by name and date of
birth.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4), the tribunal may assess filing
fees, reasonable attorney fees, fees for genetic testing, other costs, necessary travel, and
other reasonable expenses incurred in a proceeding under this part. The tribunal may
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award attorney fees, which may be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the
order in the attorney's own name.
(4) The tribunal may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against the supportenforcement agency of this state or another state, except as provided by law.
(5) On request of a party and for good cause shown, the tribunal may order that
the name of the child be changed.
(6) If the order of the tribunal is at variance with the child's birth certificate, the
tribunal shall order the Office of Vital Records to issue an amended birth registration.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§788-15-623 (2008)

Binding effect of determination of parentage.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2), a determination of parentage
is binding on:
(a) all signatories to a declaration or denial of paternity as provided in Part 3,
Voluntary Declaration of Paternity; and
(b) all parties to an adjudication by a tribunal acting under circumstances that
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Section 78B-14-201.
(2) A child is not bound by a determination of parentage under this chapter
unless:
(a) the determination was based on an un-rescinded declaration of paternity and
the declaration is consistent with the results of genetic testing;
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(b) the adjudication of parentage was based on a finding consistent with the
results of genetic testing and the consistency is declared in the determination or is
otherwise shown; or
(c) the child was a party or was represented in the proceeding determining
parentage by a guardian ad litem.
(3) In a proceeding to dissolve a marriage, the tribunal is considered to have
made an adjudication of the parentage of a child if the question of paternity is raised and
the tribunal adjudicates according to Part 6, Adjudication of Parentage, and the final
order:
(a) expressly identifies a child as a "child of the marriage," "issue of the
marriage," or similar words indicating that the husband is the father of the child; or
(b) provides for support of the child by the husband unless paternity is
specifically disclaimed in the order.
(4) The tribunal is not considered to have made an adjudication of the parentage
of a child if the child was bom at the time of entry of the order and other children are
named as children of the marriage, but that child is specifically not named.
(5) Once the paternity of a child has been adjudicated, an individual who was not
a party to the paternity proceeding may not challenge the paternity, unless:
(a) the party seeking to challenge can demonstrate a fraud upon the tribunal;
(b) the challenger can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
challenger did not know about the adjudicatory proceeding or did not have a reasonable
opportunity to know of the proceeding; and
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(c) there would be harm to the child to leave the order in place.
(6) A party to an adjudication of paternity may challenge the adjudication only
under law of this state relating to appeal, vacation of judgments, or other judicial review.

UTAH R. Civ. P. 60

Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice,
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the
appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
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judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
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